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A PROBLEMATIC PAT ON THE BACK
FOR THE PTO: DICKINSON V. ZURKO
INTRODUCTION
Although the need for clarification had not been readily ap-
parent in the years preceding the case,' in Dickinson v. Zurko2 the
Supreme Court resolved an open question of law regarding what
standard of review is appropriate when the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit reviews the factual findings of the Patent and
Trademark Office ("PTO"). Prior to Zurko it was generally be-
lieved that the Federal Circuit could reject the PTO's fact-finding
only if it was "clearly erroneous."3 Upon closer review of the judi-
cial precedent,4 the Court determined that the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act ("APA")5 set forth the correct standard of judicial re-
view by affording greater deference to the expert fact-finding of
the PTO than would otherwise be shown to the non-expert fact-
finding of district court judges.6
I. SETTLING ON AN APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW
According to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52, a finding of
fact made by a district court judge shall not be set aside by an appel-
late court unless it is "clearly erroneous."7 This standard of review,
which exists between two judges or judicial bodies, is referred to by
the Court as "court/court" review8 and asks "whether a reviewing
judge has a 'definite and firm conviction' that an error has been
1 See In re Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447, 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1998), rev'd, Dickinson v. Zurko, 119
S. Ct. 1816 (1999) (stating that the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has
applied the same standard of review since the genesis of that court in 1982).
2 119 S. Ct. 1816 (1999).
3 See id. at 1819.
4 See infra Part III-A.
5 Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
6 See Zurko, 119 S. Ct. at 1819-22.
' See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) ("Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.").
8 See Zurko, 119 S. Ct. at 1818 (designating the review of one court by another court as
court/court review).
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committed." 9 The Patent and Trademark Office, however, is a federal
administrative agency, not a judicial body, and appellate review of its
fact-finding is not explicitly governed by Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 52.
In 1946 Congress enacted the APA in part to bring uniformity to
judicial review of administrative action,10  sometimes called
"court/agency" review." Because of the experience and expertise
possessed by most administrative agencies, 12 the standard of review
proposed by the APA shows greater deference to agency fact-finding
and is less strict than the "clearly erroneous" standard used in
court/court review. 13 According to the APA, "[a] reviewing court
shall ... hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be .. .arbitrary, capricious [or] an abuse of
discretion... [or] unsupported by substantial evidence."'14  Under
this standard, an appellate court must ask only "whether a 'reasonable
mind might accept' a particular evidentiary record as 'adequate to
support a conclusion."
'
"
5
Although it is undisputed that the PTO is an "agency" and that
the PTO's fact-finding constitutes "agency action" as described in the
APA, 16 it does not necessarily follow that the APA governs judicial
review of the PTO. While the APA's standard of review is intended to
apply to the findings of agencies like the PTO, the APA goes on to
state that the Act "[does] not limit or repeal additional requirements
imposed by statute or otherwise recognized by law."'17 The primary
question considered by the Supreme Court in Zurko was whether ju-
dicial precedent, prior to the adoption of the APA, established a dif-
ferent standard of review that trumps the APA. This Case Comment
will briefly discuss the procedural posture in Zurko, the majority's
9 Id. at 1823 (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395
(1948)).
'0 See Zurko, 119 S. Ct. at 1819; see also In re Zurko, 142 F.3d at 1450.
" See Zurko, 119 S. Ct. at 1818 (designating court review of agency fact-finding as
"court/agency" review).
12 See id. at 1822 (suggesting that courts have long invoked agency expertise as a basis for
deferring to agency fact-finding).
3 See id. at 1818, 1823.
14 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(A), (2)(E) (1994) (emphasis added); see also Zurko, 119 S. Ct. at
1821 ("[Ut apparently remains disputed to this day... precisely which APA standard-'sub-
stantial evidence' or 'arbitrary, capricious, abuse of discretion'-would apply to court review of
PTO fact-finding.").
15 Zurko, 119 S. Ct. at 1823 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197,
229 (1938)).
16 See Zurko, 119 S. Ct. at 1819 ("The parties agree that the PTO is an 'agency' subject to
the APA's constraints, that the PTO's finding at issue in this case is one of fact, and that the
finding constitutes 'agency action."').
17 5 U.S.C. § 559 (1994).
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interpretation of judicial precedent, and the policy justifications of-
fered in opposition to the holding.
II. DICKINSON V. ZURKO: THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Having found that Mary E. Zurko's proposed method for in-
creasing computer security was obvious in light of prior art, the PTO
rejected Zurko's patent application under 35 U.S.C. § 103.1 On ap-
peal to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, the PTO's own
review board upheld its patent examiner's finding by sustaining the
rejection of Zurko's application.' 9 Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 141,20
Zurko then appealed directly to the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit and convinced the appellate court that the PTO's findings of
fact on the issue of obviousness were "clearly erroneous." 21 Follow-
ing an en banc examination of the case, at the request of the Commis-
sioner of Patents and Trademarks, the Federal Circuit affirmed, con-
cluding that the "clearly erroneous," court/court standard of review
was proper in light of judicial precedent and other policy considera-
tions.22 The head of the PTO disagreed, however, and certiorari was
granted to determine whether the APA's court/agency standard of
review should apply.
23
IT. READING THE CASE LAW: EVERYBODY HAS AN OPINION
The respondent, Zurko, and supporting amici offered eighty-nine
pre-APA cases, purportedly demonstrating that prior to the adoption
of the APA, federal courts had consistently applied the stricter
court/court "clearly erroneous" standard of review when reviewing
the fact-finding of the PTO.24 According to the Supreme Court, the
Federal Circuit, which had ruled in favor of Zurko, found that the
"tradition of strict review ... amounted to an 'additional requirement'
that under § 559 trump[ed] the requirements imposed by § 706 [of the
"S See In re Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447, 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1998), rev'd, Dickinson v. Zurko, 119
S. Ct. 1816 (1999).
19 See id. (citing Ex parte Zurko, No. 94-3967 (Bd. Pat. Apps. & Int. Aug. 4, 1995));
Zurko 119 S. Ct. at 1818-19.
20 35 U.S.C. § 141 (1994) ("An applicant dissatisfied with the decision in an appeal to the
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences ... may appeal the decision to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.").
21 See In re Zurko, 111 F.3d 887 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
22 See In re Zurko, 142 F.3d at 1447; see also Zurko, 119 S. Ct. at 1819 ("The Federal
Circuit, hoping definitively to resolve the review-standard controversy, then heard the matter en
banc. After examining relevant precedents, the en banc court concluded that its use of the
stricter court/court standard was legally proper.").
23 See Zurko, 119 S. Ct. at 1819.
24 Id. at 1824-26 app. (citing cases).
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APA] .,25 The Federal Circuit also found that, "[a]lthough it was sim-
ply one of several standards discernible from the case law prior to the
... enactment of the APA, the clear error standard was nevertheless
an 'additional requirement[] ... recognized by law.' 26
As further support for its holding, the Federal Circuit examined
the legislative history of the APA including the words of the APA's
drafters. According to the Department of Justice, which had drafted
the predecessor of the APA, one of the four primary purposes of the
bill was to restate the law of judicial review of administrative ac-
tion.27 The 1947 Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative
Procedure Act stated that "the act was drafted to restate rather than
alter existing, established standards: 'It not only does not supersede
special statutory review proceedings, but also generally leaves the
mechanics of judicial review to be governed by other statutes and by
judicial rules."' 28 Consequently, the principle task for the Court in
Zurko was to identify the "judicial rules" that existed when the APA
was adopted.
The Federal Circuit also considered the fact that explicit exemp-
tions of the PTO from the APA's standard of review, which had been
included in previous versions of the bill, had been left out of the final
version of the APA.29 In the opinion of the Commissioner of Patents
and Trademarks, "by removing language excluding the [PTO] from [a
previous bill], Congress intended courts to review board adjudications
under the APA's substantial evidence or arbitrary and capricious
standards., 30 According to the Federal Circuit, however, "it is more
likely that Congress viewed an explicit exception for the [PTO] as
redundant in light of the 'otherwise recognized by law' exception. 31
In the opinion of the Federal Circuit, the use of the clear error stan-
dard when reviewing the fact-finding of the PTO was simply so well
established that an explicit exception of the PTO from the APA was
unnecessary.
A. The Majority Opinion
In spite of the Federal Circuit's strong position, however, the
Supreme Court was not so easily convinced. In the interest of "a uni-
25 Id. at 1819 (summarizing the Federal Circuit's opinion).
26 In re Zurko, 142 F.3d at 1459 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 559).
27 See id. at 1451 (citing ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE Acr 9 (1947)).
28 In re Zurko, 142 F.3d at 1451 (quoting ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AcT 93 (1947)).
29 SeelnreZurko, 142F.3d at 1451.
30 Id. at 1452.
31 See id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 559).
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form approach to judicial review of administrative action,' 32 the
Court demanded that the existence of a prior standard of review, dif-
ferent from that of the APA, "must be clear.' 33 Although many of the
cases cited by the respondent used language very similar to "clearly
erroneous" in describing the appropriate standard of review, the Court
held that the language was not conclusive.34 Indeed, even the Federal
Circuit admitted that the clear error standard "was simply one of sev-
eral standards discernible from the case law prior to the... enactment
of the APA.
' 35
In the years preceding the adoption of the APA, federal courts
had only just begun to consistently use the term "clearly erroneous" to
signify the use of the stricter court/court standard of review. 6 At that
time "[t]he relevant linguistic conventions were less firmly estab-
lished... than they are today."37 The words "clearly erroneous" were
sometimes used in the context of court/agency review, while "[o]ther
times [courts] used words such as 'substantial evidence' to describe
stricter court/court review. 3  In every case, however, even when
words like "clearly erroneous" were used, courts always did so "to
explain why they [gave] so much, not so little, deference to agency
fact-finding." 39 By emphasizing the technical expertise of the PTO,
the pre-APA cases that were cited by the respondent "indicate that
they had court/agency, not court/court, review in mind."40 In the
judgment of the majority, because the judicial precedent did not
clearly demonstrate a different standard of review amounting to an
"additional requiremento ... recognized by law,"41 the APA's stan-
dard of review must apply when the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit reviews the fact-finding of the PTO.42
32 Dicldnson v.Zurko, 119 S. Ct. 1816, 1819 (1999).
33 Id. at 1819 ("[W]e believe that respondents must show more than a possibility of a
heightened standard, and indeed more than even a bare preponderance of evidence in their fa-
vor. Existence of the additional requirement must be clear.").
' See id. at 1819-20.
" In re Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447, 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
6 See Zurko, 119 S. Ct. at 1820 ("When the CCPA decided many of these cases during
the 1930's and early 1940's, legal authorities had begun with increasing regularity to use the
term 'clearly erroneous' to signal court/court review, and the term 'substantial evidence' to
signal less strict court/agency review.") (citation omitted).
37 Id.
38 1&
" Id. at 1822.
4 Id.
41 5 U.S.C. § 559 (1994).
42 See Zurko, 119 S. Ct. at 1819 ("[W]e conclude that those cases do not reflect a well-
established stricter court/court standard of judicial review for PTO fact-finding, which circum-
stance fatally undermines the Federal Circuit's conclusion."); id. at 1822 ("Given the CCPA's
explanations, the review standard's origins, and the nondeterminative nature of the phrases, we
cannot agree with the Federal Circuit that in 1946, when Congress enacted the APA, the CCPA
20001
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
B. The Dissent
In contrast to the judgment of the Zurko majority, the dissent, led
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and joined by Justice Kennedy and Justice
Ginsburg, believed that the stricter "clearly erroneous" standard of
review was firmly in place prior to the adoption of the APA. Accord-
ing to Chief Justice Rehnquist, it was "undisputed... [by] both the
patent bench and the patent bar... that the stricter 'clearly erroneous'
standard was indeed... a requirement placed upon the PTO."'43 The
dissent found that "the APA by its plain text was intended to bring
some uniformity to judicial review of agencies by raising the mini-
mum standards of review and not by lowering those standards which
existed at the time. '44
Furthermore, with respect to the majority's methodology, Chief
Justice Rehnquist criticized the majority for having deferred to the
PTO's interpretation of the applicable case law.45 In contrast, the
Chief Justice would have given more consideration "to the [opinion
of the] Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the specialized Arti-
cle I court charged with review of patent appeals. ' 46 The Chief Jus-
tice could see no reason to reject the sensible and unanimous resolu-
tion of the issue by the more experienced Federal Circuit 47
IV. ADDITIONAL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
In addition to judicial precedent, the Supreme Court also consid-
ered (and rejected) two significant policy justifications that had been
offered as grounds for rejecting the APA's standard of review.
A. Consistency
The Court first considered a suggestion by the Federal Circuit
that a change in favor of the APA's more deferential standard of re-
view would be "needlessly disruptive" given that "both [the] bench
and [the] bar have now become used to the Circuit's application of a
'recognized' the use of a stricter court/court, rather than a less strict court/agency, review stan-
dard for PTO decisions.").
43 Id. at 1826 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
4 Id. at 1827.
45 See id.
46 Id.
47 See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("In this case the unanimous en bane Federal Cir-
cuit and the patent bar both agree that these cases recognized the 'clearly erroneous' standard as
an 'additional requirement' placed on the PTO beyond the APA's minimum procedures. I see
no reason to reject their sensible and plausible resolution of the issue.").
[Vol. 50:797
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'clearly erroneous' standard."'' Simply stated, "it is better that the
matter remain 'settled than that it be settled right.' '49
The Supreme Court rejected this argument, finding instead that
the Federal Circuit overstated the practical effect of a "change" in the
standard of review.50 According to the Court, "the difference [be-
tween the standards of review] is a subtle one-so fine that (apart
from the present case) we have failed to uncover a single instance in
which a reviewing court conceded that use of one standard rather than
the other would in fact have produced a different outcome."'51 In the
opinion of the Court, a change in the standard of review would have
little or no practical effect on the outcome of patent appeals,5z and
therefore, the risk of "undermin[ing] the public's confidence" in the
predictability of the judicial system was minimal.53
B. The APA Creates a Procedural Anomaly
Second and perhaps most importantly, the Court considered the
possibility that a change in favor of the APA's standard of review
would create a procedural anomaly that would encourage a disap-
pointed patent applicant to pursue a longer appeal process on his or
her way to the Federal Circuit in order to receive stricter judicial re-
view. Although the Court offered little discussion on the issue before
dismissing it as a basis for rejecting the APA's standard of review, it
is perhaps worthy of closer consideration.
1. Alternative Remedies
Following a rejection at the Board of Patent Appeals and Inter-
ferrences ("the Board"), a disappointed patent applicant has two pos-
41 Id. at 1822.
49 Dickinson v. Zurko, 119 S. Ct. 1816, 1822 (1999) (quoting Square D Co. v. Niagara
Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 424 (1986)); see also In re Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447,
1457 (Fed. Cir. 1998), rev'd, Dickinson v. Zurko, 119 S. Ct. 1816 (1999) ("Courts do not set
aside long-standing practices absent a substantial reason.").
50 See Zurko, 119 S. Ct. at 1823 ("[W]e believe the Circuit overstates the difference that a
change of standard will mean in practice.").
51 Id.
52 But see Mark D. Torche, Note, Rubber Stamp or Court of Last Resort: The Proper
Standard of Review in Patent and Trademark Cases, 48 DRAKE L. Rv. 211, 228 (1999) (citing
Federal Circuit Judge Michel for the proposition that the suggested change in the standard of
review would result in ninety-five to ninety-nine percent of patent appeals being affirmed in
favor of the PTO rather than the usual eighty percent).
53 In re Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Of course, the Court's own logic
might be turned on its head. One might argue that a change with no anticipated effect cannot be
justified and can only result in confusion as the Federal Circuit feared.
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sible remedies.54 These remedies are mutually exclusive so that by
choosing one the applicant forecloses the possibility of returning to
the other.55 Consequently, each applicant's choice of remedy will be
guided by careful consideration of which remedy offers the greatest
possibility of success. According to the policy argument offered in
opposition to the majority's holding, stricter review of the PTO's un-
favorable decision will be available under the longer and more com-
plicated of the alternative remedies, thereby encouraging disappointed
applicants to always take the less efficient path. Although dismissed
by the Zurko majority, this concern has real merit.
a. Direct Appeal to the Federal Circuit
The first possible remedy is a direct appeal to the Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 141.56 This was
the remedy selected by Zurko. Of the two possible remedies, this one
is the most similar to a traditional appeal. Evidence not presented to
and not considered by the PTO will not be considered by the Federal
Circuit Consequently, the only fact-finding under review is the ex-
pert fact-finding of the PTO. Following the Court's decision in Zurko,
the Federal Circuit will review the PTO's fact-finding using the
APA's standard of review. This standard, which shows greater defer-
ence to the PTO than the clear error standard, will offer very little
chance of success to a disappointed patent applicant on appeal.58
b. Civil Suit in United States District Court
The other possible remedy is a civil action against the Commis-
sioner of Patents and Trademarks to obtain a patent in federal district
court pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 145.59 Often referred to as a "trial de
'4 See Zurko, 119 S. Ct. at 1824 ("An applicant denied a patent can seek review ether
directly in the Federal Circuit, or indirectly by first obtaining direct review in federal district
court.") (citations omitted).
55 See 35 U.S.C. § 141 (1994) (stating that by filing an appeal under § 141 the applicant
waives his or her right to proceed under § 145); see also 35 U.S.C. § 145 (1994) (stating that a
dissatisfied patent applicant may have remedy by civil action under § 145 unless appeal has
been taken in the Federal Circuit under § 141).
6 35 U.S.C. § 141.
57 See Burlington Indus. v. Quigg, 822 F.2d 1581, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (quoting Hoover
Co. v. Coe, 325 U.S. 79, 83 (1945)) ("[Ihe hearing is summary and solely on the record made
in the [PTO].").
-8 See Torche, supra note 52, at 228 (suggesting that after adoption of the APA standard
of review, ninety-five to ninety-nine percent of appeals would be affirmed in favor of the PTO)
(citing En Banc Federal Circuit Hears Argument on Reviewing PTO Fact Findings, 55 Pat.
Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 1354, at 96 (Dec. 4, 1997)).
59 35 U.S.C. § 145.
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novo,"6 an action under § 145 differs greatly from a § 141 appeal
because the disappointed patent applicant is permitted to present new
or different evidence on issues originally considered by the PTO.
61
The use of the term "trial de novo," however, is not entirely accurate
given that the admissibility of new evidence is limited.62 For exam-
ple, "evidence [that] was available . . . but was withheld from the
[PTO] as a result of fraud, bad faith, or gross negligence, may be ex-
cluded at [a] trial [pursuant to § 145]. "63 Consequently, an action pur-
suant to § 145 is really a proceeding of a hybrid nature-with limited
admissibility for new evidence, which supplements the record sup-
plied by the PTO. 64
In addition to the differences with respect to the presentation of
evidence, by adopting the APA's standard of review, the Court in
Zurko also created another significant difference between the alterna-
tive remedies provided by § 141 and § 145-the applicable standard
of review. In a trial pursuant to § 145 the district court reviews the
PTO's fact-finding under the "clearly erroneous" standard that was
rejected in Zurko.65 Furthermore, when the district court considers
new or different evidence not considered by the PTO, there is no need
to show deference to the PTO and the court is free to decide the facts
de novo.66 While Zurko requires the Federal Circuit to review the
PTO's fact-finding under the APA's standard of review when appeal
is taken pursuant to § 141, the Court in Zurko did not alter the stan-
dard of review that applies to district court review of the PTO's fact-
finding pursuant to § 145.67 Consequently, although not addressed as
60 See Monsanto Co. v. Kamp, 269 F. Supp. 818, 822 (D.D.C. 1967) (describing the na-
ture of a § 145 action).
61 See Burlington Indus., 822 F.2d at 1584; Monsanto Co., 269 F. Supp. at 822.
62 See Monsanto Co., 269 F. Supp. at 822.
63 id.
64 See Winner Int'l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, No. 98-1553, 2000 WL 66374, at *5 (Fed.
Cir. Jan. 27, 2000) (discussing § 145 and § 146 actions together and concluding "[b]ecause the
record before the district court may include the evidence before the Board as well as evidence
that was not before the Board, we have often described the district court proceeding as a hybrid
of an appeal and a trial de novo") (internal quotations omitted). The Monsanto court reasoned
similarly:
The administrative record of the Patent Office forms the nucleus of the evidence be-
fore the District Court. Unlike, however, the customary judicial review of adminis-
trative decisions where the administrative agency acts on a record, the Court does
not confine itself to that record in these cases. Additional evidence is admissible in
support of contentions advanced by the parties in the Patent Office. It is this feature
that has led to the inaccurate use of the appellation 'trials de novo' in these actions.
Monsanto Co., 269 F. Supp. at 822.
65 See Burlington Indus., 822 F. 2d at 1854.
66 See id; cf. Wang, 2000 WL 66374 at *4.
67 See United States Filter Corp. v. Ionics, Inc., No. 98-10541-REK, 1999 WL 893046, at
*4 (D. Mass. Oct. 8, 1999) ("[T]he discussion in Zurko does not focus upon the standard of
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a procedural anomaly by the Court, there is a very basic difference
between § 141 and § 145 review that would lead a disappointed pat-
ent applicant to avoid direct appellate review in the Federal Circuit.
By bringing a civil action in federal district court pursuant to § 145, a
disappointed patent applicant would immediately receive stricter re-
view than that available under § 141 and thereby stand a greater
chance of success.
2. The Procedural Problem
While the application of different standards of review in what are
intended to be alternative remedies is itself a potential problem, the
real procedural anomaly addressed by the Court in Zurko is the one
that is created on appeal from a § 145 civil action. Although § 141
and § 145 actions are alternative remedies, the judgment of a district
court pursuant to a § 145 civil action, if unfavorable, may nonetheless
be appealed to the Federal Circuit.68 Consequently, a disappointed
patent applicant can reach the Federal Circuit in one of two ways-
either by direct appeal pursuant to § 141 or by indirect review
following a § 145 civil action.69
As previously discussed, a federal court on appeal will review
another court's fact-finding for clear error in what the Court has
termed courtlcourt review. It is the possible use of the "clearly erro-
neous" standard of review in this situation that generates fear of a
procedural anomaly.70 Following the Court's decision in Zurko, if the
Federal Circuit reviews the case of a disappointed patent applicant
pursuant to § 141, it will apply only the APA's standard of review.71
But, if the Federal Circuit reviews the case of a disappointed patent
applicant by way of appeal from a § 145 civil action, then it might use
the stricter "clearly erroneous" standard of review.72 The concern,
expressed by opponents to the Zurko decision, is that disappointed
patent applicants contemplating an appeal will in every case select
review applicable to the procedural posture of the present case, which is the review by a United
States District Court of the PTO's findings under 35 U.S.C. § 145.").
(8 See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (a)(4)(C)
(1994) ("The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive juris-
diction of an appeal from a decision of a district court to which a case was directed pursuant to
section 145 ... of title 35.").
69 See Dickinson v. Zurko, 119 S. Ct. 1816, 1824 (1999) ("An applicant denied a patent
can seek review either directly in the Federal Circuit, or indirectly by first obtaining direct re-
view in federal district court.") (citations omitted).
70 See In re Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (rejecting the APA standard of
review in order to promote consistency between the Federal Circuit's review of the Board of
Patent Appeals and its review of the district courts).
71 See Zurko, 119 S. Ct. at 1824.
72 See id. (citing Gould v. Quigg, 822 F.2d 1074, 1077 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
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review under § 145. 73 The problem with this decision is that the path
to the Federal Circuit through a § 145 civil action is longer and con-
sumes more judicial resources than direct appeal by § 141.74
3. Use of the Clearly Erroneous Standard in Court/Court Review
It is not entirely clear, however, that the use of the "clearly erro-
neous" standard is appropriate when the Federal Circuit reviews a §
145 civil action on appeal. The question remains whether the district
court is the finder of fact in a civil action pursuant to § 145, thereby
justifying court/court review. According to the Court in Zurko:
We are not convinced ... that the presence of the two paths
creates a significant anomaly. The second path [through §
145] permits the disappointed applicant to present to the
court evidence that the applicant did not present to the PTO.
The presence of such new or different evidence makes a fact-
finder of the district judge. And nonexpert judicial fact-
finding calls for the court/court standard of review. We con-
cede that an anomaly might exist insofar as the district judge
does no more than review PTO fact-finding, but nothing in
this opinion prevents the Federal Circuit from adjusting re-
lated review standards where necessary. 75
If the district court is the fact-finder because its decision is based
upon new or different evidence not previously considered by the PTO,
then the nonexpert fact-finding of the district court is entitled to less
deference and should be reviewed more critically under the
court/court clear error standard. In the opinion of the Court, the dif-
ference in the standard of review is justified in such a situation and
there is no "procedural anomaly.
'
"
76
If, however, the district court merely reviews the fact-finding of
the PTO, and there is no new evidence, then arguably it is acting as an
appellate court, not the fact-finder. In such a situation, the Court im-
plies that the PTO remains the true fact-finder and there is no justifi-
cation for the Federal Circuit to alter its standard of review from the
APA standard that would have been applied had the patent applicant
reached the Federal Circuit through direct appeal.77 To the extent that
" SeeZurko, 119 S. Ct. at 1824.
74 See id. ("The result, the [Federal] Circuit claims, is that the outcome [of a patent ap-
peal] may turn upon which path a disappointed applicant takes; and it fears that those applicants
will often take the more complicated, time-consuming indirect path in order to obtain stricter
judicial review of the PTO's determination.").
75 Id.
76 See id.
77 See id
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the Federal Circuit would apply the "clearly erroneous" standard of
review in such a situation, the Court admits the possibility of a proce-
dural anomaly.78
The question then remains, when does a district court in a civil
suit pursuant to § 145 become the finder of fact? Or, put another way,
when is the district court entitled to hear "new or different" evidence?
As stated above, the term "trial de novo" is not an entirely accurate
description of a § 145 action.79 While the district court is permitted to
supplement the PTO's record with new evidence, there are limita-
tions. The "plaintiff may not submit for the first time evidence which
he was negligent in failing to submit to [the PTO]."80 Furthermore, in
the interest of promoting "sound judicial administration,"8' the plain-
tiff "is precluded from presenting new issues, at least in the absence
of some reason of justice put forward for failure to present the issue to
the [PTO]
8 2
4. The Problem Addressed
Consequently, given the limitations on new evidence, it would
seem that the district court would rarely act as the true finder of fact
and the use of the term "trial de novo" would in most cases be inap-
propriate in reference to a § 145 action. In a typical case, "new" evi-
dence would not be admissible, and a situation would arise that the
majority concedes might lead to a procedural anomoly.83
In the opinion of the Court, this problem, even if common, is not
difficult to overcome and therefore not a justification for rejecting the
APA's standard of review.84 The solution is simply for the Federal
Circuit to adjust its review accordingly, realizing that even on appeal
from a § 145 action it is still reviewing the expert fact-finding of the
PTO for which the APA standard is appropriate.85 Although tempted
to review the district court under the court/court "clearly erroneous"
standard, the Federal Circuit should confine itself to the more defer-
ential APA standard of review given that the PTO remains the true
finder of fact when no new evidence is presented.
78 See id.
79 See Monsanto Co. v. Kamp, 269 F. Supp. '818, 822 (D.D.C. 1967) (finding that § 145
actions "are proceedings of a hybrid nature. They are sometimes denominated 'trials de novo',
but such use this term is somewhat loose. Proceedings in this Court in actions of these... types
are not true or genuine trials de novo").
go California Research Corp. v. Ladd, 356 F.2d 813, 821 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
81 DeSeversky v. Brenner, 424 F.2d 857, 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
8 Id. at 858.
83 See Dickinson v. Zurko, 119 S. Ct. 1816, 1824 (1999) ("We concede that an anomaly
might exist insofar as the district judge does no more than review PTO fact-finding.").
84 See id.
8 See id.
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5. The Problem Overlooked
In reality, the district court, in an action pursuant to § 145, will in
almost every situation prove to be the finder of fact, even when no
"new" evidence is presented. The true problem, and the one dis-
missed by the Court in Zurko, is that the presentation of "different"
evidence to the district court is sufficient to make it the finder of
fact,86 a situation which the Court concedes justifies court/court re-
view on appeal.87
In an ex parte proceeding before the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences, a patent applicant is not permitted to present live testi-
mony on disputed facts.88 In a civil trial pursuant to § 145, however,
the district court hears testimony from live witnesses as well as oral
argument. 89 Even when the offered testimony is limited to the factual
issues that were originally before the Board, the nature of the live tes-
timony still rises to the level of "different" evidence as specified by
the Court in Zurko.90 In the judgment of the Federal Circuit,
"[a]lthough the import of the evidence before the Board and the dis-
trict court might be the same in many or all ways, the form in which it
is presented is fundamentally different." 91 Consequently, "[i]n its
evaluation of the evidence.., the district court [has] a powerful ad-
vantage over the patent examiner and the Board, an advantage char-
acteristic of section 145 appeals, in that the court [can hear] and [see]
witnesses, testifying under examination and cross-examination, and
[has] the benefit of extensive discussion and argument." 92 In confor-
mity with this notion, the Federal Circuit has recently held that, "the
admission of live testimony on all matters before the Board... makes
a factfinder of the district court."93
Consequently, the real problem following Zurko arises out of the
Court's concession that once the district court becomes the finder of
fact, the court/court standard of review is appropriate on appeal from
a § 145 action. What the Court did not anticipate was the fact that by
hearing live testimony, even on disputed facts considered by the PTO
and the Board, the district court becomes the fact-finder regardless of
86 See id. ("The presence of such new or different evidence makes a fact-finder of the
district judge.") (emphasis added); see also Burlington Indus. v. Quigg, 822 F.2d 1581 (Fed.
Cir. 1987).
"7 See id.
See Winner Int'l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, No. 98-1553, 2000 WL 66374, at *7 (Fed.
Cir. Jan. 27, 2000).
"' See id.
90 See id. at *6-8.
9' Id. at *6.
92 Burlington Indus. v. Quigg, 822 F.2d 1581, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1987), quoted in Wang,
2000 WL 66374, at *6.
9' Wang, 2000 WL 66374, at *7.
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the presentation of "new" evidence. As a result, a disappointed patent
applicant will, in almost every situation, stand a greater chance of
success in the Federal Circuit if he or she foregoes review under §
141 in favor of § 145 review. ,
Implicit in the Court's brief discussion of the issue is the premise
that the justifiable situations in which the Federal Circuit' standard of
review will be different, depending upon the path taken by the appli-
cant, are infrequent. In reality, a dissatisfied patent applicant can ma-
nipulate the process to ensure that the district court is always the
finder of fact and therefore always entitled to court/court review. Be-
cause the Court's premise is incorrect, it has unwittingly conceded
that the availability of different standards of review depending upon
the path taken to the Federal Circuit is justifiable in a large number of
situations.
V. ELIMINATING § 141 AS A PRACTICAL MATrER
Although the Court in Zurko rejected the offered policy consid-
erations as being insufficient to justify the rejection of the APA's
standard of review, there is a least some merit to the concern that the
Court, through its holding, has created a procedural anomaly. By lim-
iting the Federal Circuit to the use of the APA's standard of review
when appeal is taken pursuant to § 141, the Court has, in effect,
eliminated the usefulness of that appeal process to a disappointed pat-
ent applicant. By selecting the alternative remedy of § 145, a disap-
pointed patent applicant will find two opportunities for stricter review
of the PTO's unfavorable findings than that available under § 141.
First, the district court itself will utilize the stricter clear error standard
in its review of the PTO's findings of fact. 94 Second, the Federal Cir-
cuit will use the stricter, court/court, clear error standard of review on
appeal from a § 145 action to the extent that the district court is the
finder of fact. 95 The effect will be an increased likelihood of success
under § 145 and therefore decreased use of § 141. In this way the
Court's opinion in Zurko is taxing to judicial resources by encourag-
ing disappointed patent applicants to select the longer and more com-
plicated alternative path on appeal.
Furthermore, because the Federal Circuit on appeal from a § 145
action will only apply the stricter clear error standard of review to the
extent that the district court is the finder of fact, disappointed patent
applicants will be encouraged to make the district court the fact-
finder. Because the district court is the fact-finder only when it hears
new or different evidence, disappointed patent applicants will be en-
94 See Burlington Indus., 822 F.2d at 1584.
95 See Dickinson v. Zurko, 119 S. Ct. 1816,1824 (1999).
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couraged to present testimony and argument to the district court on
every issue of fact in the hopes of receiving stricter review on appeal.
In this manner as well, the Court's decision in Zurko promotes results
that will tax judicial resources through longer trials at the district
court level and the needless presentation of cumulative evidence. To
ensure stricter review on appeal from a § 145 action, patent applicants
will be encouraged to offer live testimony on every issue rather than
rely upon the record produced by the PTO.
VI. CONCLUSION
Prior to the Court's decision in Dickinson v. Zurko, it was gener-
ally accepted that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit could
not reject the factual findings of the PTO unless they were clearly
erroneous. After closer review of the judicial precedent, the Supreme
Court concluded that the standard of review most often used in prac-
tice was not clearly enough established to trump the standard pro-
vided for in the APA. Therefore, when the Federal Circuit reviews the
fact-finding of the PTO pursuant to § 141, it must apply the APA,
court/agency standard of review. Under this standard the expert fact-
finding of federal administrative agencies, like the PTO, are shown
greater deference and cannot be reversed provided that they are sup-
ported by substantial evidence.
Although arguably in accordance with the law, there are signifi-
cant policy problems with the Court's decision. Namely, the use of
the more deferential standard of review offers less opportunity for
success for a disappointed patent applicant than that available under a
more complicated and time-consuming alternative remedy. The result
of the Court's decision will be an increased burden on judicial re-
sources as disappointed patent applicants consistently select a more
complicated appeal process in order to receive stricter judicial review
and increase their likelihood of success.
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